NEUTRALITY, THE RACE QUESTION, AND.
THE 1991 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT:
THE "IMPOSSIBILITY" OF PERMANENT REFORM
Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
A funny thing happened to the 1991 Civil Rights Act' on its

way to being vetoed as another "Quota Bill." (Now) Justice
.Clarence Thomas was nominated and confirmed in a bruising
and ultimately unsatisfactory set of Senate hearings and debates. The victors and the defeated united after that struggle

to enact a bill that George Bush ultimately was able to sign.
We will never know whether George Bush would have signed a
"Civil Rights Bill" if Clarence Thomas had not been nominated

and/or confirmed, but it is clear that the impetus to help one of
Clarence Thomas' chief supporters, Senator Danforth, was a
large part of the decision to sign what became the 1991 Civil
Rights Act.

In the wake of this institutional history and the inability of
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(codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C. and 42
U.S.C.).
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Title VII to live up to its promise, the discussions that led to
the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act suffer from three
fundamental mistakes: the belief in a permanent and fixed
legal standard; the belief that it is possible to develop permanently neutral standards; and the failure to address the serious reality of racism in America. The first belief, what I will
call the fixity assumption, is not new, but it has remained a
part of the discussion of legal reform even as it has been driven out of the rest of the academy by legal realism and political
sophistication.2 The second assumption is equally important
because it reflects the degree to which-despite the lessons of
realism and the preaching of economists,3 critical legal scholars, 4 and critical race theorists--there is still a firm belief in
what I will call the neutrality assumption. Finally, there is
buried deep inside the legal structure a failure to want to ask
what I have called the race question in the context of employment discrimination law. Stated simply, "How does race alter
the contours of legal reality?" The reform of the employment
2. See, e.g., John J. Donohue, III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA.
L. REV. 1411 (1986) (assuming a fixed legal standard and arguing that
the government can improve the job market experience of disadvantaged
groups and increase social welfare in the long run, despite short-run
losses, by helping society find more rapidly the equilibrium it will eventually reach); Richard B. Freeman, Black Economic Progress after 1964:
Who Has Gained and Why?, in STUDIES IN LABOR MARKETS 247 (Sherwin

Rosen ed., 1981) (associating real economic gain with the period of Title
VII enforcement and measuring these gains by assuming Title VII legal
standards have remained constant); Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency
and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 513 (1987) (questioning
the conclusions of Donohue about the impact of antidiscrimination law,
but assuming fixity). See also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS
(1992) (examining the history of government intervention to eliminate
discrimination and concluding that it cannot be successful, but assuming
that legal standards are, in fact, fixed over time).
3. See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. &
ECON. 1 (1960) (demonstrating that the legal definitions of causation and
causal direction are problematic); Jerome M. Culp, Causation, Economists,
and the Dinosaur: A Response to Professor Dray, 49 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 23 passim (1986) (arguing that economists have propounded two
different approaches to causality).
4. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987).
5. See generally PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY OF RACE AND
RIGHTS (1991).
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discrimination laws embodied in the 1991 Civil Rights Act does
not effectively raise or answer the race question. This failure to
raise and answer the race question means that federal judges,
in interpreting this statute, will not raise and answer this
crucial question, and that future Congresses will have to address the need for reform again and again. Undoubtedly, these
will be the Civil Rights Acts of 1998, 2005, and 2010. Unfortunately, none of these acts will "permanently' resolve the issue
of race in American society.
It is unclear when Title VII became patent medicine in the
efforts to eradicate the social scourges of racial discrimination.
A majority of federal judges, led by the Reagan-Bush-appointed
majority on the Supreme Court, have come to believe that Title
VII cannot be a significant agent in removing the vestiges of
our long history of racial discrimination. For some federal
judges and commentators, the potential effectiveness of Title
VII is frustrated by the inability of law to control market forces.7 For judges who accept this perspective, law has no power
to alter the current economic status of blacks in the labor market.' Other judges argue that Title VII is unnecessary medicine for a disease that is curing itself.9 For these judges, there

6. By permanent, I mean that there would be a time in America
when race would no longer be an important marker for social, legal, and
economic status. There may be more than one manner of reaching that
situation, but all will result in a change in the status of blackness.
7. See the opinion of Justice Rehnquist in Furnco Construction
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978) ("Courts are generally less
competent than employers to restructure business practices, and unless
mandated to do so by Congress should not attempt it.").
8. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 259-66; see also Richard A.
Epstein, Gender is for Nouns, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 981, 995-1005 (1992)

(arguing that sex discrimination can be controlled by the private sector
through market forces).
9. Justice O'Connor seems to take this position with her argument

in City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), that the
real problems have to do with minor, racially-neutral differences between

people, and that the city could attack those problems. While not a Title
VII case, it is clear that this concern about the real impact of Title VII
animates the Court in a number of other cases. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 657-76 (1987) (Scalia,

J., dissenting) (implying that any effort to remedy societal discrimination
will simply create a class of innocent white workers who will bear the
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is no real (as defined by differences in market wages) problem
that needs to be addressed by antidiscrimination law, and Title
VII is a placebo.10 For yet another group of federal judges,
racism is just one of several evils that law cannot influence or
change, and judges should appreciate the fact that race discrimination, like poverty and other social disorders, will remain a part of the American body politic." These views of the
impotence of Title VII have become the jurisprudence of Title
VII. Indeed, this jurisprudence is eerie proof of the point recently made by Derrick Bell that racism is permanently embedded in the fabric of the American society.12 These views
say that black Americans should expect no significant help in
eliminating the vestiges of slavery and racism from the government; these views assume that racial differences will continue
to haunt us for the foreseeable centuries. Indeed, when the
Court quotes Justice Powell's admonition in Wygant that, "[i]n
the absence of particularized findings, a court could uphold
remedies that are ageless in their reach into the past, and
timeless in their ability to affect the future,"" the Court suggests that the status quo with respect to race-where blacks
are economically exploited,14 socially isolated, and politically
brunt of this social policy with no real gain).
But see Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990
(1988) (I[Elven if one assumed that any such discrimination [caused by
discretionary decisions by supervisors] can be adequately policed through
disparate treatment analysis, the problem of subconscious stereotypes and
prejudices would remain."). Justice O'Connor makes clear in both Watson
and Johnson that she is not completely convinced that discrimination has
been eliminated. See id. at 989-91; Johnson, 480 U.S. at 655-57.
10. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (holding
that societal discrimination causes many of the differences between races
and cannot be constitutionally or fairly eliminated by judicial action).
11. This seems to be the view of Justice Powell in Wygant, 476 U.S.
at 276 (Powell, J., plurality opinion) and Justice O'Connor in Croson, 488
U.S. at 498-99.
12. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTOM OF THE WELL 13 (1992).

13. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). See, e.g.,
Croson, 488 U.S. at 498.
14. Blacks remain nearly twice as likely to be unemployed as white
Americans. See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 341, tbl. B-38

(1992); see also WILLIAM A. DARITY & STEVEN SCHULMAN, THE QUESTION
OF DISCRIMINATION 81 (1989).
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impotent-is less important than principles associated with racial neutrality. This is a view of law and justice which places
the interests of black Americans outside the legal discourse of
the courts. It is important to note that this Court has not gone
as far as the most extreme members of the Court have urged.
A majority of the Court has so far agreed to continue private
voluntary affirmative action, 5 but this approval was before
recent changes on the Court that have substituted Justices
Souter and Thomas for Brennan and Marshall.
The explanations put forth by courts and commentators have
made the jurisprudence of Title VII more reminiscent of the
tax code than a simple expression of the equitable principles
from which antidiscrimination law springs. Indeed, in 1993,
even after the adoption of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, the state
of antidiscrimination law is anything but clear. 6 Finally, de-

15. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480
U.S. 616, 647-48 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
16. Some people who have examined the statute claim that it is
inconsistent. The 1991 Act explicitly rejects Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989):
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds that (1) additional remedies under Federal law are needed to
deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the
workplace;
(2) the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) has weakened the scope
and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections; and
(3) legislation is necessary to provide additional protections
against unlawful discrimination in employment.
SEC. 3. PURPOSES.
The purposes of this Act are (1) to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination and unlawful harassment in the workplace;
(2) to codify the concepts of "business necessity" and "job
related" enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other Supreme Court
decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S.
642 (1989); . ...
§§ 2-3, 105 Stat. at 1071. In § 2, Congress says that its intention is to
overrule the aspects of Wards Cove that have weakened Title VII, but §
3(2) says that the Congress would like to restore the law to the state
that existed prior to Wards Cove. Since some have said that Wards Cove
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spite the enactment of the most detailed Civil Rights statute
ever, the 1991 Civil Rights Act leaves a great deal of unchecked discretion in the hands of federal judges and juries.
Title VII can be effective in altering the economic position of
black Americans, but its effectiveness is tied to the interpretation of that law by federal judges. Indeed, these interpretations
of Title VII suffer from the problems associated with the fixity
assumption, the neutrality assumption, and the failure to ask
and answer the race question. Only if the courts reject the first
two and answer the last can the issues associated with the
permanence of racial inequality be addressed.
This paper has four parts. In the next section, I will examine
how the Court has analyzed the use of race in constitutional
and statutory situations. In the subsequent section, I will examine how the courts have responded to these problems, in
particular with respect to Title VII. In the last two sections, I
will discuss how the 1991 Civil Rights Act will have to be interpreted in order to deal with the great question posed by our
experience with race.
II. RACE, THE CONSTITUTION AND MODERN LEGAL JURISPRUDENCE

Current legal interpretations usually examine legal issues
associated with race by saying that race is either "special" or
irrelevant. Race is entitled to heightened (special) scrutiny in
constitutional litigation, but it is generally irrelevant to most
legal decisions. 7 However, this "special" scrutiny in constitutional settings in most cases does not translate into much
sensitivity to black concerns when race is a predominant is-

simply created a clear majority for a position advocated by a plurality in
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988), and since
Watson came before Wards Cove, the question is whether the 1991 Act
intends to overrule Watson as well as Wards Cove. The 1991 Act is silent on this point.
17. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (Stone,
J.). See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1000
(1978); Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
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sue.18 In a few areas of the law, the courts have concluded
that race ought to be irrelevant, but they have also made it
almost impossible for anyone to succeed in insisting that the
reality of black people's lives be in accord with that irrelevance, whether in matters of child custody,"9 segregation of
prisoners," the death penalty,2 or jury selection,' and especially in employment issues.'
In order to be legitimate on their own terms, judges and
legal scholars continually assert that race must be suppressed,
i.e., do not ask the race question. Justice Powell expressed this
perspective in an employment context in Wygant v. Jackson

18. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312-13 (1987)
(holding that disparities in sentencing are the inevitable product of the
criminal justice system and cannot be considered discrimination within
the meaning of the Constitution); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
250-52 (1976) (holding use of civil service examination not subject to
constitutional challenge pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 when district court
holding is supported by general validation study that test is useful in
telling city who will pass the training program). But see Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (holding that race cannot be considered
as a factor in a custody suit when the white mother has remarried a
black second husband).
19. See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433.
20. See Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333-34 (1968) (per curiam)
(holding that prisoners cannot be segregated permanently on the basis of
race in order to create peace).
21. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 295-96 (finding that statistical difference in sentencing depending upon victims' race is irrelevant to constitutionally permissible use of death penalty).
22. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1986) (holding that
use of peremptory challenges by prosecution to exclude black jurors because of their race violates right to impartial jury).
23. See Smith v. Homer, 839 F.2d 1530, 1538-39 (11th Cir. 1988)
("Title VII does not require an employer to hire or promote the most
qualified applicant. Nor does it require that a candidate be given preference over other applicants because of race. Rather, it merely requires
that employers not disadvantage certain employees based on race . ... "
(citation omitted)); Wright v. Western Electric Co., 664 F.2d 959, 964 (5th
Cir. 1981) ("It is . . . unnecessary for the employer to prove that those
hired were more qualified than the plaintiff for the job. 'The employer
has the discretion to choose among equally qualified candidates, provided

the decision is not based upon unlawful criteria.'" (quoting Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981)).
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Board of Education.24 In that case, the question was whether
a contractual provision that provided limited protection for
newly hired black workers violated the constitutional limitations imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants argued that this decision
had been bargained for as part of the contractual process in
which whites were a majority, and the court of appeals agreed
with the trial court that this kind of plan did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause because the school board had adopted
it in order to eliminate societal discrimination by having minority teachers as role models for minority students. In reversing the lower court's decision, Justice Powell said:
Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a
basis for imposing a racially classified remedy. The ... theo-

ry announced by the District Court and the resultant holding
typify this indefiniteness. There are numerous explanations
for a disparity between the percentage of minority students
and the percentage of minority faculty, many of them completely unrelated to discrimination of any kind. In fact, there
is no apparent connection between the two groups ....

No

one doubts that there has been serious racial discrimination
in this country. But as the basis for imposing discriminatory
legal remedies that work against innocent people, societal
discrimination is insufficient and over-expansive. In the absence of particularized findings, a court could uphold remedies that are ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless
in their ability to affect the future. 5
Justice Powell explicitly adopted the neutrality assumption
when he spoke of the ageless quality of looking into the past
and the timeless qualities of influencing the future. He was, of
course, creating a straw man. In Wygant, there was no demand
by anyone for either an ageless, unfettered reach into the past
or a future containing an uncharted response to unlimited
black demands. The district court's decision in this case merely
gave force to a clause in a collective bargaining agreement. The
agreement, by definition, was limited by its duration; it was
subject continually to the vagaries of a union political process

24. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
25. 1& at 276 (emphasis added).
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and a local government political process in which the black
teachers protected by the contract provision were a distinct
minority. There might be cases involving race in which the
Court's concern would be more appropriate, for example, an
historically black profession using its political power to advantage its own members; but even that policy would require a
change in the way that judges approach such issues because,
absent an explicit use of race, such policy should not violate
constitutional or statutory provisions against discrimination in
most circumstances.26 But this hypothetical situation does not
apply in Wygant. In fact, if there is a policy ageless in its reach
into our legal past and timeless in its reach into the future, it
is the Court's efforts to protect the interests of white workers
in the job market. The "innocent" white workers that Justice
Powell spoke of were no more nor less innocent, and might in
fact have been less aggrieved, than the black workers who
would be laid off by the Court's refusal to enforce the contractual protection provided for the black teachers in this case. In
such circumstances, black workers are likely to find that their
prospects are significantly and permanently injured, and that
they will suffer permanent losses that will be greater for them
than comparable losses for white workers.27
Wygant also illustrates the Court's adoption of a view of the
past and a perception of workers' interests fixed outside contemporary evaluations of justice. In trying to measure and
evaluate the settled expectations of the party before the Court,
Justice Powell was unable to give full credence to the interests

26. But see City of Richmond -v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 49596 (1989) (O'Connor, J.) (holding that because Richmond had five blacks
on the nine-member city council and because blacks made up 50% of the
city's population, equal protection analysis required strict scrutiny of an
ordinance providing for a race-conscious subcontractor program). As Jus-

tice Marshall pointed out in dissent, this view of strict scrutiny was not
used in other situations. Id. at 552-57 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
If this principle were universally applied, then much legislation that
adversely affects blacks would have to go through such scrutiny, including such legislation as criminal statutes and welfare laws. Tine Court
rejected this- approach with respect to poverty in San Antonio Indepen-

dent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1973), and with
respect to race in Washington v. Davis, 426

U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976).

27. See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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of black workers. Indeed, even if the Court believed its function was to protect the expectations of white teachers with seniority, it failed. When this layoff provision was adopted, the
school board at first refused to enforce it; but after losing cases
brought in federal and state courts, it began enforcing the
provision." If settled expectations must be given precedence,
then should the Court not have appreciated the expectations of
black teachers that they would enjoy some protection?' Justice Powell did not weigh these expectations or consider them,
and the reason is largely that in his myopia he did not see
them as real.' When explaining why the Court had to reverse
the lower court on this seniority-related matter, Justice Powell
concluded: "Even a temporary layoff may have adverse financial as well as psychological effects. A worker may invest many
productive years in one job and one city with the expectation of
earning the stability and security of seniority."3
The problem with this analysis is that it ignores completely
the interests of black workers. Justice Powell was so busy
looking at the injuries to the "innocent" white senior workers
that he ignored the injuries to the settled expectations of the

28. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 272.
29. I say "some" because, of course, the provision was not permanent
and could always be changed by the union bargaining and political process. The school board may have had, or at least at this time thought it
had, some duty to change the racial makeup of the faculty and therefore
might have bargained hard to keep rules that would allow it to do so,
but this is severely limited by the need to make other compromises;
unfettered and timeless it was not.
30. My colleague Richard Schmalbeck suggests one defense of Justice
Powell's view. This argument revolves around whether the provision in
-the labor contract is valid. It goes as follows: If the validity of that provision is the first and necessary issue for the Court to resolve, the Court
never has the opportunity to weigh those concerns of black incumbent
workers because those concerns, in fact, are simply the product of an
invalid contractual provision. The problem with this argument is that it
is completely tautological. In essence, it assumes that the only issue is
whether the contract is valid. But Justice Powell uses the injuries to the
white incumbent workers as proof that there is a need to find the contractual provision invalid. If the issue of the social costs to these workers
is to be examined, the costs to black workers of not upholding the provisions must be examined as well.
31. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283.
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minority workers involved. Both innocent black and white
workers had known since this agreement was made in 1972,
five years before the first layoff after the active enforcement of
the layoff provision began, that in an economic downturn black
workers were to have some additional protection from layoff.
This additional protection from layoff might have led some of
these black teachers to take jobs in this school district. Certainly, given the nation's history of discrimination, it is likely
that those black teachers weighed the decision of where to seek
employment more carefully than the white teachers did.32 The
black teachers may well have made investments in their job
every bit as large as the investments made by the more senior,
incumbent white workers.' But the fact of those black investments is invisible to the white majority, including members of
the Supreme Court. It is said that the bench is color-blind;
indeed it is-blind to black concerns and interests. Judges
make these assumptions as a matter of course.
In deciding Wygant, Justice Powell should have sought to
balance the interests of black workers in the correction of past
wrongs having present and future impact against the possible
harm to white workers' interests. But he could not-because he
could not even see the interests of black workers. Thus, Wendy
Wygant's claim as a senior incumbent (white) worker triumphed without ever having been in combat. This blindness is
the very heart of the existing jurisprudence in that area of
employment discrimination.
It is important to remember that the assumptions of fixity
and neutrality are not a new view of race and the law, but
products of a long, tortured jurisprudential history. In 1883, in
defense of the view that race is different from other issues,
Justice Bradley said,

32. Black workers at every education and age level are more likely

to become unemployed than white workers and, once unemployed, are
more likely than white workers to stay unemployed. See, e.g., Janina C.
Latack & Ronald D. D'Amico, Career Mobility Among Young Men: A
Search for Patterns, in THE CHANGING LABOR MARKET 91, 98-107 (Stephen M. Hills ed., 1986).
33. It should be noted that the seniority issue here is almost completely an equitable issue and that the efficiency concerns of other affirmative action protection have almost no place in this case.
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When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of
beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitant of that state, there must be some stage in the progress
of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and
ceases to be the special favorite of the laws .... "

The view thus expressed has two major problems, one grounded in the past and the other looking at the future. It declares
that blacks have been the beneficiary of tangible goods and
rights from society, a claim not supported by the historical
record,' and assumes that any change in the existing

34. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
35. Justice Bradley supports his argument for this view of race by
stating:
There were thousands of free colored people in this country before the abolition of slavery, enjoying all the essential rights of
life, liberty and property the same as white citizens; yet no one,
at that time, thought that it was any invasion of his personal
status as a freeman because he was not admitted to all the
privileges enjoyed by white citizens, or because he was subjected
to discriminations in the enjoyment of accommodations in inns,
public conveyances and places of amusement. Mere discriminations on account of race or color were not regarded as badges of
slavery.
Id.
Of course this view of the history of slavery and freedom in antebellum America (North and South) is a monstrous lie. See, e.g., LEONARD
P. CURRY, THE FREE BLACK IN URBAN AMERICA: 1800-1850, THE SHADOW
OF THE DREAM 87 (1986) (Jury testimony by free persons of color and
black testimony against whites were prohibited in the southern states, including major cities and Ohio. In other northern states whose laws did
not prohibit the empaneling of Negro jurors, black residents were, nevertheless, never summoned for jury duty. The Ohio legislature went further
still, resolving in 1839 that "the blacks and mulattoes, who may be residents within this state, have no constitutional right to present their
petitions to the General Assembly for any purpose whatsoever, and that
any reception of such petitions on the part of the General Assembly is a
mere act of privilege or policy and not imposed by any expressed or implied power of the constitution." (emphasis added)).
When Justice Bradley argued that "no one, at that time, thought"
that blacks were being denied basic rights, he accurately described only
the majority of whites. Blacks did protest this oppression, if only faintly.
See generally C. PETER RIPLEY, WITNESS FOR FREEDOM 1-28 (1993); Louis
Ruchames, Jim Crow Railroads in Massachusetts, in BLACKS IN WHITE
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structure made because of black people will create a "special
status" that makes black people the "special favorites" of the
law. Current members of the Court, and even some people who
helped to enact the 1991 Civil Rights Act, believe these postulates to be so basic that they never even express them; but
adherents of these unquestioned attitudes make up the core of
the "blind"' and "neutral"37 school of legal interpretation
AMERICA 394 (Robert Haynes ed., 1972) (blacks unsuccessfully seek access
to railways through courts, but eventually succeed in a limited way before legislature). Black people were severely restricted in the North and
South in how they could hold property, and in almost all of the states
they could not vote. Bradley made the first attempt to argue that there
is a distinction between race and slavery, but the history of race and
slavery shows that the exact opposite is true. See generally JOHN H.
FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. Moss, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM (6th ed.
1988). See also IRA BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS (1974). It was

necessary to severely restrict the lives of free blacks so as to prevent
them from providing an example to slaves and so as not to threaten the
consensus that slavery was necessary to protect black people. These racial restrictions on free blacks included racial deference laws in Louisiana
and in Richmond, id. at 123, 320-21; mobility restrictions, id. at 92-93;
educational restrictions, id. at 304-05; and forced labor exaltations, id. at
208-09. See also BARBARA J. FIELDS, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM ON THE
MIDDLE GROUND 69-72, 78-82 (1985); V. JACQUE VOEGELI, FREE BUT NOT
EQUAL 1-9 (1967); RICHARD C. WADE, SLAVERY IN URBAN AREAS (1964).

Bradley's view of the nation's legal history was not accidental. He
had experienced the racial structure in this country long enough to know
that what he said was a lie. In that sense, his rewriting of history is
only one of the earliest examples of such reinterpretations, and is in
some sense more intentional than the work of those who write from the
twentieth century and accept such statements as being accurate descriptions of our legal past.
36. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added):
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this
country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education,
in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be
for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds
fast to the principles of constitutional liberty. But in the view of
the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no
superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste
here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens ....
37. See THOMAS SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS 266-69 (1980)

(arguing against "special treatment" for blacks).
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with respect to race. Justice Bradley's reading of the circumstances of the country in 1883 remarkably anticipates the
prevailing view in the 1990s.
This view of law and race, blind to the history of past
wrongs against black Americans and ever vigilant against
future benefits toward these same citizens and their descendants, remains the chief perspective on race and the law, just
as misplaced in today's jurisprudence as it was then, and just
as unacknowledged by those who hold it. It is this notion of
specialness of black concerns that runs through much of the
jurisprudence of the Constitution and Title VII on employment
rights. For example, in Regents of University of California v.
Bakke,' the Court found that the Constitution prohibits some
race-sensitive admission decisions. Accordingly, it concluded
that while the University of California's policy for admission to
medical school was appropriate with respect to positions set
aside for children of white alumni and the largely white children of California's political elite, it was inappropriate for
admissions officials to look at the racial composition of the
applicant pool, because racial makeup was a special issue that
could pass constitutional and statutory muster only in very
limited situations.39
The Court has taken this blacks-as-beneficiaries view in
most of its racial jurisprudence. Justice Powell adopted a version of it in his Wygant opinion, arguing that the district
courts "are under a clear command from this Court, starting
with Brown v. Board of Education, to eliminate every vestige
of racial segregation and discrimination in the schools. "4° The
history of the Court's involvement with school desegregation is
long and involved, but it requires a reading possible only from
the blacks-as-beneficiaries perspective to see the Supreme
Court as having given such a clear mandate.41 From the re38. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Powell, J.).
39. Id. The courts and commentators have also consistently concluded
that blacks have been the unwarranted beneficiaries of remedial actions
for harms in the past. Nathan Glazer perhaps put this view best when
he stated that there was no discrimination at present against blacks. An
Interview with Nathan Glazer, NEW PERSPECTIVES, Fall 1985, at 27, 28.
40. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (citation omitted).
41. Sce Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation
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cord, it is not clear that a federal judge would or should see
that she has a mandate to eliminate every vestige of discrimination in school cases. It is clear that Brown did not provide
such a mandate, and even clearer in the employment context
that antidiscrimination law has' not been so interpreted.42
This jurisprudence of celebration of the status quo as race
neutral is not new, and it continues to infect judicial views of
race and the law.4

and the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 728 (1986) (observing that
courts and commentators have never successfully defended the rejection

of freedom of choice); see generally Derrick Bell, A Model Alternative
Desegregation Plan, in SHADES OF BROWN 125, 125-39 (Derrick Bell ed.,
1980) (arguing against a necessity to racially integrate all schools, especially those currently all or predominantly non-white, but claiming the
focus should instead be on improving the quality of education for all
children equally).
42. Judges and commentators often speak as if our current system in
fact eliminates all racial discrimination. For example, Terry Eastland and
William Bennett argue:
The fundamental question of what attention to race the law does
and should allow arises in Weber, just as it did in Bakke. And
individual rights are important, whether the individual is a doctor or a pipefitter, a lawyer or a janitor. And individual rights
should be protected from all racial discriminations, whether they
be "private" and "voluntary" or not. Weber has unambiguously
conferred "privilege . . . by race.

TERRY EASTLAND & WILLIAM J. BENNETT, COUNTING BY RACE 210 (1979)
(emphasis added). The problem with the Eastland-Bennett formulation of
the issue is that there is no constitutional or statutory protection for
workers against all discrimination. The courts have made it clear that an
employer is not required to hire the most qualified 'employee; accordingly,
all that is prevented in a constitutional and statutory sense is provable
racial discrimination. Even those things that we know are discriminatory
may not be discriminatory sufficiently and clearly enough to raise
antidiscrimination concerns. See, e.g., McCarthney v. Griffin-Spalding
County Bd. of Educ., 791 F.2d 1549, 1552 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that
"failure to hire the most qualified applicant may be circumstantial evidence of discrimination"). See also Smith v. Homer, 839 F.2d 1530, 1539
(11th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted) ("Where, as here, several candidates
are well-qualified for a single position, and the district court accepts the
employer's testimony that it chose the person it thought best qualified for
the job, that finding ordinarily will not be overturned on appeal.")
43. For another view of this in an historical context, see Randall
Kennedy, Race Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case
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Courts and commentators refuse to answer the race question
because it is simply not possible to find a neutral perspective
from which race can be viewed in our society. I mean not only
that we all belong to racial groups with our own prejudices,
but, more importantly, that race is part of how we define ourselves in social interaction."" Part of that definition, whether
acknowledged or not, is to take for granted whatever privileges
and immunities may be associated with our condition. For
black Americans, these privileges and immunities remain significantly impeded by the badges and incidents of slavery. For
white Americans, these rights and privileges remain unencumbered by the burdens placed on black people.4 White Americans perceive gains from having black Americans around."' It

of Professor Schmidt, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1623-28 (1986).

44. Professor Fields points out that, at least in an historical setting,
race is a construct of historians. She notes that the biological differences
between ethnic groups are greater than the differences among American
blacks, and that the genetic basis of racial groups is largely discredited.
She contends that historians have made too much of race in an historical
context. Barbara J. Fields, Ideology and Race in American History, in
REGION, RACE, AND RECONSTRUCTION 143 (J. Morgan Kousser & James

M. McPherson eds., 1982).
I submit that Americans, including many historians, tend to accord
race a transhistorical, almost metaphysical, status that removes it from
all possibility of analysis and understanding. Ideologies, including those of
race, can be properly analyzed only at a safe distance from their terrain.
To assume, by intention or default, that race is a phenomenon outside
history is to occupy a position within the terrain of racialist ideology and
to become its unknowing-and therefore uncontesting-victim.
But even if race is just an ideological construct of society, it is a
powerful force-certainly as powerful as being an American or Canadian
for most residents of North America. Even if slavery had not been a racial phenomenon and had not been the inevitable result of racial prejudice, it became so in this country, and the results on our legal system
are profound.
45. For an eloquent discussion of these issues for contemporary
Americans, see Adrian Piper, Passing for White, Passing for Black, 58
TRANSITION 4 (1992).

46. Economic analysis has demonstrated that such assumptions of
gains and losses depend critically on white Americans' taste for racial
property. By racial property, I mean the assumption that being white
conveys rights and privileges that are important and need to be protected. These privileges are psychological and economic. See Derrick A. Bell,
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is this unacknowledged gain that most courts and commentators ignore in legal settings. If black Americans have been
cheated of their birthright, then justice demands some amelioration of their condition. 7 Courts can play an integral role in

Racism: A Prophecy for the Year 2000, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 93, 94, 10304 (1989); Derrick A. Bell, Does Discrimination Make Economic Sense?
For Some--It Did and Still Does, 15 HUM. RTs. 38, 41-42 (Fall 1988); see
generally Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race
and Original Understandings, 1991 DUKE L. J. 39; Barbara J. Flagg,
'Was Blind, but Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993); Cheryl I.
Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1707 (1993). I believe
that much of this property, including the economic, is illusory, and that
if we were to end the power of racism in American life, it would permit
an increase in both the psychic and economic well-being of "all" Americans. This is difficult to prove, but any other assumption suggests that
the most pessimistic interpretation of Derrick Bell's thesis that racism is
permanent is correct. See BELL, supra note 12, at 13.
47. Another common complaint about including a black perspective is
that this is a country of laws, not of men; thus, the majority must prevail or we run the risk of making tyrants of judges. A black perspective
on the law is not illegitimate in this sense for two reasons. First, a black
perspective simply seeks the opportunity to compete, and to the extent
that judges respond to that in other legitimate ways, this goal is not
inconsistent with the judicial system. Second, laws intended to end the
long history of employment discrimination particularly need such a perspective because blacks were significantly excluded from the political process when these statutes and constitutional provisions were adopted or
enacted. To the extent that courts adjust for this problem, they are performing a function -similar in tone, if not in substance, to the kind of
arguments generally made about constitutional issues. See JOHN H. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 87-104 (1980). It is extremely difficult, even in
a perfectly democratic society, for political will to be expressed appropriately. Even if we know what we want, the opportunity to vote for a
person who exactly represents those views may not arise and there is no
certainty that, over time, the political process will accurately reflect our
views. This is particularly true of a racial minority precisely because it is
a "discrete and insular" minority. Id. at 135.
But see Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 713, 742 (1985). Blacks remain the victims of poverty and discrimination, but the focus in constitutional litigation on the discreteness and
insularity of black groups misses the fundamental point. Groups that are
now most likely not to have "adequate representation" are the exact
opposite of discrete and insular minorities:
Long after discrete and insular minorities have gained strong
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providing that relief.
Against this historical backdrop of legal and philosophical
analysis, the Court embarked in pathbreaking manner toward
the 1991 Civil Rights Act. In a number of opinions, the Court
continued to cabin the legal ability to alter the economic condition of black Americans and to do so permanently. The Court
concluded that, while other groups might have the right in
certain circumstances and the ability to change the economic
representation at the pluralist bargaining table, there will remain
many other groups who fail to achieve influence remotely proportionate to their numbers: groups that are discrete and diffuse
(like women), or anonymous and somewhat insular (like homosexuals), or both diffuse and anonymous (like the victims of poverty).
Id. If Ackerman is right, blacks are or will be adequately represented in
the political process. However, as recently as 1990, there were no black
Senators and only five percent of the members of the House of Representatives were black. Arguably, black views already are included in the
political process and do not need any "special" concern by the courts. I
think, however, there is at least an argument that Ackerman anticipates
the future, and does not confront the present.
There are, in essence, three ways that popular will can be expressed in our society. One is through the market. Economic power gives
citizens the opportunity to use that power to express their concerns. In
our society, we leave much of that choice to such market-oriented power.
But blacks have found this a difficult route for several reasons, including
the fact that market opportunities have been denied them, and economic
power is not evenly distributed among black and white citizens. The
second avenue is through the political process-the opportunity to nominate, elect, and watch elected officials. This process requires a great deal
of effort, and it can be thwarted by those willing to make large enough
investments of energy. Finally there is the effective use of "voice." See
generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970). Voice
is an alternative to the use of market power, and it is the use of political will to change the way the society is structured. In various ways,
voice is the expression of that political power. Courts can provide an
opportunity for a particular kind of voice that is extremely necessary
when operating within a complicated social system. Courts provide citizens with the right to say that the process is treating them unfairly and
with the opportunity to force the other parts of the American system, the
market and other governmental organs to correct that unfairness. In that
sense, recognizing a black perspective is simply a special case of the
general concern that all people should have voice. Thus, courts do not act
inappropriately when they listen to black voices and, if persuaded by
these calls for justice, respond.
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position of African Americans, Title VII cannot be effectively
used to accelerate that process. These opinions were partially
reversed by the 1991 Civil Rights Act, but ultimately the creators of the new policy did not attack the root causes of racism
in this area of statutory and constitutional problems.
III. WATSON, SOCIAL REFORM, AND THE 1991 CML RIGHTS
ACT

A.

The Law and Economics of Title VII Enforcement

The question of the impact of Title VII on the incomes and
position of black Americans has been the subject of much investigation, and a general consensus has started to form regarding its scope and direction. Unfortunately, in coming to
this consensus, investigators have assumed a fixity of law that
is inconsistent with its actual history.
Every day, federal judges apply Title VII to particular cases
by making indirect assumptions about the potential impact
various interpretations of that legislation will have on the
labor market. These analyses may be sophisticated or simplistic, depending on the ability of the judges doing the analysis
and the parties before the court.4 Be that as it may, federal
judges have been little concerned with the different ways in
which Title VII might legitimately be interpreted. As a result,
there has been too little reflection on how Title VII could be
interpreted to alter the economic position of black Americans.
This concern with the social implications of interpretations of
Title VII is crucial in understanding the potential and power of
this law.
Models of discrimination assume that if there is wage discrimination against black workers, then wages paid to whites

48. For an example of an excellent, sophisticated use of economic
thinking, see Judge Patrick Higginbotham's opinion in Vuyanich v. Re-

public Natl Bank of Dallas, 409 F. Supp. 1083 (N.D. Tex. 1976), rev'd,
723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1984). Justice O'Connor makes a very sophisticated analysis of the economic issues involved in the settlement in Ford
Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982) (allowing companies the right to
cut off back-pay liability without including lost seniority in order to encourage settlement of Title VII issues). Unfortunately, this analysis does
not include a full discussion of all the problems created by these issues.
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and blacks will differ, with W, > Wb. In the long run, this model should eliminate the effectiveness of such discrimination by
encouraging capital and labor to move toward firms and industries that do not discriminate or discriminate less. According to
this model, in the long run, people with equal ability will be
paid equal wages, and there will be no effective, i.e., marketobserved, discrimination in wages between black and white
workers.49 This does not mean that there will not be people
who discriminate against black people, but that this discrimination will not influence the wages that black people receive in
the long run. Firms not in equilibrium will either pay a premium through reduced profits or find niches in the market where
black workers are not necessary and where discrimination,
though real, will not influence market wages.
The proponents of these models argue that if the average
abilities of blacks and whites differ,' a dilemma exists. If
antidiscrimination statutes require Wb = W., then white employers are faced with two options. They can restrict the number of blacks they hire, hiring only the most highly skilled
.blacks; or they can hire blacks with lower skill levels than
whites, but pay them the same wage as white workers, thus
losing money on each black hired. This situation necessarily
means that employers are encouraged by financial constraints
49. This does not mean that no one will discriminate against black
workers, but that attempts to discriminate against blacks will be made
ineffective by market forces.
Nondiscriminators will hire blacks at higher rates than they would
in the absence of discrimination until the ability of discriminators to
affect market wages is eliminated. If Title VII is interpreted to outlaw
segregation, this process will be slowed, but it will still work in the long
run. See generally GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OFDISCRIMINATION
157-60 (2d ed. 1971). This model assumes that there is only one kind of
labor, further assuming that the marginal product of black and white
labor is the same. This is not an important assumption since the existence of differences in skill will not change the analysis. It is clear that
Title VII does not require employers to pay workers with different marginal products the same wages, and no one seriously suggests that the
courts should adopt such an interpretation.
50. Economists would describe these differences in ability as differences in the marginal product of workers (i.e., dQ/dL. > dQ/dL). Economists argue that these differences exist because discrimination has caused
blacks to have lower levels of job skills.
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to cheat the effective enforcement of Title VII by paying blacks
lower wages or by refusing to hire black workers.51 Others
have argued that Title VII provides black and other workers
with greater rights if they are discharged; accordingly, firms
may be reluctant to hire black workers because they come with
a potential legal bill.
This argument seems wrong on empirical grounds because
black workers are not likely to win Title VII cases. 2 Furthermore, a number of labor laws, including the Age Discrimination Act, are laws that provide substantial protection to white
workers. Additionally, this view treats white women as being
not white for the purposes of employment discrimination law.
In any case, these flaws are remediable if the
antidiscrimination laws appropriately target hiring decisions
as well. At least one commentator has suggested that we ought
to look at Title VII as a kind of program to reach long-run
equilibrium more rapidly,' but even this view of the possi51. See Edward Lazear, The Narrowing of Black.White Wage Differentials Is Illusory, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 553 passim (1979) (noting that
black workers' age-earning profiles are less steep than those of white
males due to less access to on-the-job training for blacks than for
whites).
52. See Paul Burstein, Legal Mobilization as a Social Movement Tactic: The Struggle for Equal Employment Opportunity, 96 AM. J. Soc.
1201, 1214-15 (1991) (success of reported Title VII plaintiffs declines
steadily over time). See also Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race,
Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest
Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1073, 1096-97 (1992) (with respect to the lack of interest defense,
the success of race discrimination plaintiffs has declined significantly and
now mirrors the low success rate of sex discrimination plaintiffs).
53. See Donohue, supra note 2, at 1423-30. Donohue proposes a
different perspective on the impact of antidiscrimination efforts inside
this simple model. He contends that if antidiscrimination laws can move
the market to equilibrium market-clearing wages more rapidly than
would otherwise occur, even in this simple model antidiscrimination laws
would seem to play a pro-competitive, efficiency-enhancing role. Judge
Posner argues, in partial rebuttal, that this argument does not account
for the costs of administering Title VII and lost welfare incurred in forcing the world toward this new equilibrium. See Posner, supra note 2, at
513-14. In essence, Judge Posner contends that relying on the market
may be a less costly way to reach long-run equilibrium than through
anti-discrimination laws. Posner, supra note 2, at 513. He further con-
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bility of change is too limited if it does not account for all of
the costs involved in discrimination today.
There are four problems with this simple model, as well as
with more complicated models used to analyze black-white
income differentials. These problems also involve the issues
inherent in the fixity and neutrality assumptions, and the failure to ask the race question. The first two problems involve
methodology; they deal with implicit assumptions in the model
that do not accurately reflect the labor market.' The second
two problems deal with the failure of those who have looked at
these issues to take into account how judges and the law work.
These errors in modeling law also share a restricted vision of
the purposes of law and amount to the fixity assumption. The
four problems all (1) assume that the labor market is in competitive equilibrium (the market fallacy); (2) ignore the possibility of eliminating the market informational content of race
(the racial fallacy); (3) assume that Title VII is limited to influencing market wages, making it a kind of equal pay act for
blacks (the quantity fallacy); and (4) assume that the law is
fixed, with only one unique interpretation of Title VII (the
fixity assumption). The first two issues, the market fallacy and
the racial fallacy, are the social science equivalents of the neutrality assumption and the failure to ask the race question.
Both of these assumptions at their heart take the racial present as limiting all possibility of change, mistakenly assuming
such an analysis is neutral. The race question-how race has

tends that antidiscrimination provisions may also discourage black hiring
by making it sometimes more expensive to hire blacks than to hire similarly-situated white workers because of the higher transaction costs in
hiring black workers. Posner, supra note 2, at 513. Donohue demonstrates that the administrative costs are likely to be small against the
likely gain. But as we will see, he limits the scope of those benefits and
inflates the scope of losses in ways that underestimate the potential gain
from antidiscrimination laws. John J. Donohue, III, Further Thoughts on
Employment Discrimination Legislation:'A Reply to Judge Posner, 136 U.
PA. L. REV. 523, 549-51 (1987).

54. Since Milton Friedman's contribution to economic thought in the
1950s, economists have argued that the reality of the assumptions of
models does not matter. What matters from this perspective is the ability
to predict results. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE
EcONOMICS (1953).
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distorted existing circumstances-has not been appropriately
examined. Let us briefly examine these four errors.
First, the market fallacy. This model assumes that labor
markets reach competitive equilibrium, and that we can base
policy on that assumption. However, substantial evidence
shows that labor markets suffer from a systematic failure to
reach equilibrium. Labor supply is greater than labor demand.
Accordingly, even full employment involves some residual
unemployment, in addition to whatever structural unemployment may occur." Several economists have recently prbposed
models (known in the economic literature as efficiency-wage
models) that conclude that it may be optimal, for several reasons, for firms not to pay wages that will clear the market of
excess labor (i.e., not to pay a wage high enough that no one
remains in the labor market who is qualified to do the job, and
is willing to accept a lower-than-current wage in order to be
employed)." These models modify the simple models of labor
behavior by postulating that both workers and employers have
an interest in the amount of effort workers put into their jobs.
When on-the-job effort is included as an endogenous by-product
of the labor relationship, employers have an incentive to pay
higher than market-clearing wages."7 Incumbent workers
have an incentive to refuse to work with those who would
drive down the wage by offering to work at below-existing-

55. Frictional unemployment results from workers' efforts to find
other jobs. Structural unemployment results from geographic or occupational disequilibriums that produce more unemployment. See, e.g.,
EDMUND S. PHELPS, INFLATION POLICY AND UNEMPLOYMENT THEORY 3-34

(1972).
56. See generally EFFICIENCY WAGE MODELS OF THE LABOR MARKET

(George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen eds., 1986). For earlier models that
make similar points, see Duran Bell, Jr., The Economic Basis of Employee Discrimination, in PATTERNS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 121 (George
M. von Furstenberg et al. eds., 1974), and Barbara R. Bergmann, The
Effect on White Incomes of Discrimination in Employment, 79 J. POL.
ECON. 294 (1971).

57. These are known as shirking models because they deal with the
possibility that workers will reduce their efforts (i.e., shirk) unless there
are appropriate incentives. See Carl Shapiro & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Equilibrium Unemployment As a Worker Discipline Device, 74 AM. ECON. REV.
433, 433-43 (1984).
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market levels and, accordingly, to limit severely the ability of
unemployed workers to compete through wage competition."'
In at least some of these models, antidiscrimination efforts
have a straightforward and unambiguous positive effect on the
total income of society and the income of groups excluded from
the primary market.59 This is true because, for black workers
who are concentrated in the secondary sector (the part of the
labor market categorized by lower wages and less employment
stability), the wage that will induce them to enter the primary
sector'(that part of the labor market categorized by relatively
high wages and stable working relationships) and to maintain
high job effort is lower than the wage that will have the same
result for white workers. This situation exists simply because
blacks have lower expectations of job opportunities than whites
do. Accordingly, affirmative action efforts that increase the
number 6f blacks in the primary sector will do so at wage rates
lower than wages paid to white workers hired from the secondary sector.'
58. See generally Assar Lindbeck & Dennis J. Snower, Cooperation,
Harassment, and Involuntary Unemployment: An Insider-Outsider Approach, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 167 (1988). In addition, if there are economic

reasons why there is always some unemployment due to expectational
imperfections--even at full employment-there may be unemployment
that is unrelated to racial classifications. For an example of a model in
which there are such imperfections, see John Roberts, An Equilibrium
Model with Involuntary Unemployment at Flexible, Competitive Prices and
Wages, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 856 (1987).
59. See Jeremy I. Bulow & Lawrence H. Summers, A Theory of Dual
Labor Markets with Application to Industrial Policy, Discrimination, and
Keynesian Unemployment, 4 J. LAB. ECON. 376, 401-04 (1986).
60. This may explain why many companies support the notion of
affirmative action:
[Tihe only losers in the process are the Johnsons of the country,
for whom Title VII has been not merely repealed but actually

inverted. The irony is that these individuals-predominately unknown, unaffluent, unorganized-suffer

this injustice

at the

hands of a Court fond of thinking itself the champion of the
politically impotent.
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616,
677 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia might have added the word white to describe the

Johnsons of the world. He recognizes corporate support for affirmative
action, but he attributes it to the fact that firms find it cheaper to use
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Those who have adopted the standard model are biased in a
traditional manner. Their concerns with issues in the labor
market lead them to emphasize the equilibrium possibilities of
the market, while ignoring the disequilibrium qualities of unemployment. Since black Americans are more likely to be unemployed than white Americans, of course they are more concerned with the disequilibrium in that labor market. Since it is
precisely these disequilibrium issues that are involved in the
passage of Title VII, it is inappropriate for commentators and
judges to ignore them. Disequilibrium that barely affects the
white community can leave the black community devastated.
In this sense, the glass is really three-fourths empty for the
black community, while it is essentially full for the white community. To assume that this situation is appropriate enforces a
policy of neutrality that is inappropriate.
Second, the racial fallacy. In estimating the gain from reduced employment discrimination, traditional models tend to
underestimate the benefits and overstate the costs of
antidiscrimination efforts in ways that systematically disfavor
the interests of the black community. The costs of racism are

"quotas" than to suffer the cost of litigation associated with
antidiscrimination suits. Id. at 676. But Justice Scalia postulates about
such a reaction without any empirical support or an effective model of
employer behavior that accounts for employer costs associated with
antidiscrimination legislation. Companies recognize that, under current
interpretations of Title VII, the expected costs of litigation are small.
These efficiency-wage models also suffer from the difficulty that
they do not explain, given the corporate support for affirmative action,
why employers do not engage in affirmative action without governmental
pressure, or, to put it more bluntly, if the government is so smart, why
don't employers also become smart in the long run. One answer may be
that there are nonmodeled obstacles to this kind of activity, including the
noncooperation discussed in some of the noncooperative efficiency wage
models. This may also explain why there has been more assistance for
high-skill workers; because there are relatively few high-skill workers in
the job market, employers may be able to find places for them without
introducing them to situations that will evoke maximum employee hostility. See Lindbeck & Snower, supra note 58, at 179-82. It may be impossible to hide low-skill black workers because there are relatively more of
them. In any event, the lack of corporate affirmative action remains
effective in reducing the job market experiences of the more numerous
black labor force.
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extremely large. They include realities as stark as shortened
lifespans, and indignities as commonplace as being casually
assumed to be a criminal in many everyday encounters. 1
When these economic commentators have attempted to measure the impact of racism on the total community, they have
tended to take as given or unmeasurable the costs to black
people of this tremendous direct and indirect discrimination in
the labor market.' Without such discrimination, storeowners
in Washington, D.C., Newark, or any other major city could
not have refused young black men entrance into their establishments because of their color. When commentators assume
that a shopkeeper who uses race as information is simply acting in self-interest in evaluating the situation, they are taking
as given a world in which blackness is economically connected
to the likelihood of being a criminal and having other unhelpful labor market qualities. Commentators simply have not seen
the unquestionable costs of this assumption as being as real as
the dollar costs of administering Title VII, or even as important or central as the psychic costs associated with eliminating
the ability of employers and employees to discriminate.'

61. See, e.g., Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Notes From California: Rodney
King and the Race Question, 70 DENY. U. L. REV. 199 (1993). For excellent discussions of the kinds of penalties imposed on black people, see
also DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED? 140-177, 215-235 (1987);
Patricia J. Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of
Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV.
127, 127-30 (1987).
62. See, e.g., A. MICHAEL SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING 98-106 (1974);
Kenneth J. Arrow, Models of Job Discrimination, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

IN ECONOMIC LIFE 83 passim (Anthony H. Pascal

ed.,

1972);

Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM.
ECON. REV. 659 passim (1972). These models ignore the black perspective. They assume that the world is a given, and that the use of racial
information, whether or not that information is correct, exists. They do
not examine whether the removal of this kind of information-by eliminating the differences between the races that make the use of this information possible-would produce a better world. This question is at least
part of what a court must address in determining the contours of Title
VII enforcement.
63.
Some might contend, however, that in analyzing Title VII, we
should simply refuse to recognize the psychic costs imposed on
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Third, the quantity fallacy. The traditional models from
which most commentators and courts work exhibit an unreasonably simplistic understanding of what antidiscrimination
law is all about. In general, they assume that Title VII will
impact the wage rate paid to black workers, but is powerless to
influence the number of blacks hired. This perception of Title
VII is out of touch with the realities of Title VII enforcement
and the extensive interpretation of how the question of numbers should be included in this analysis.' Enforcement of Title VII is not restricted to simply requiring W = Wb. It has required that employers also be interested in the number of
blacks employed, at least with respect to hiring and promotion.
This means that both the number of blacks and the wage rate
paid to them will affect employers' hiring policy. In essence,
black employment becomes complementary with the employment of white males (when the demand for white males goes
up, so does the demand for blacks). Jonathan Leonard has
argued that we should look at the enforcement efforts as a tax
on the employment of white males," the incidence of which
depends on the mobility of white males in the firms that are
covered by antidiscrimination statutes. However, there is some
evidence that this tax is small." Questions that would raise
discriminators when they associate with black workers. In that
case, the nondiscriminatory outcome that Title VII seeks to impose is by definition optimal, and the only remaining questions
are whether the Act can move us toward that outcome and at
what cost.
Donohue, supra note 53, at 538. The costs that Donohue takes as given
-assume that white employers and employees have a property right to

exclude black workers, and that the issue is whether that property right
should be taken away. For black citizens, the question is more properly
how to enforce their right of access to the labor market. This right has
roots in our law and in the black experience. The costs of this loss of
black rights is not a factor in Donohue's equations.
64. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See

also the discussion of Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977
(1988), infra part III.B.
65. Jonathan S. Leonard, Employment and Occupational Advance
Under Affirmative Action, 66 REV. ECON. & STAT. 377, 378 (1984) (providing a model of affirmative action as a tax). See also Bulow & Sum-

mers, supra note 59.
66. At a conference on the Fourth Edition of Posner's ECONOMIC
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the race question with respect to public policy in
antidiscrimination law are (1) how much does enforcement of
antidiscrimination law increase wages of blacks and reduce
wages of white men, and (2) how much change does it bring in
black men's share of employment?
Fourth, the fixity assumption. These models treat the law as
an exogenous phenomenon. It is not. Lawyers know and appreciate that legal rules evolve and change as a result of political
perspective and changing perceptions of justice and injustice,
but economists tend to worry about the impact of changes in
the law only when the changes are caused by labor market
forces.67 By making the assumption that legal doctrine is internally decided, economists eliminate difficult problems of

ANALYSIS OF THE LAW, John Donohue said that his investigation of the
cost of getting insurance for all labor-related law claims shows it is less

than $65 annually per person. John Donohue, Comments on Richard
Posner's ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW at George Mason School of
Law (Jan. 28, 1993).
67. There has been a vigorous debate in the literature of law and
economics about the evolution of the law. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The

Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977). Economists in general have rejected the possibility that political perspective can explain legal evolution. See RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 505-14 (3rd ed. 1986) ("The
principle explanation for judicial behavior must lie elsewhere than in
pecuniary or political factors."). Judges maximize a utility function that
includes power, prestige, and leisure, but does not include political inter-

ests. Id. at 506. See also Donohue, supra note 2; Posner, supra note 2.
But see generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and Economics-And the New Administrative Law, 98 YALE L.J. 341 (1988) (suggesting an alternative economic approach, The Reformist School, to the three
dominant law and economics theories).
Economists tend to believe that exogenous market forces can alter
the law. However, they believe that the law is like the Ten Commandments. The law is given to judges by these market forces (as the Ten
Commandments were to Moses) by God's chosen representative after
having been written with the finger of God. Judicial discretion based
upon concerns for justice are too ad hoc and, accordingly, not an appropriate part of an objective economic model of discrimination. What are
appropriate notions of. justice enter into the equations only as ways of
delegitimating the law or creating error. See George L. Priest, Measuring
Legal Change, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATIONS 193 (1987).
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measurement. While economists are aware that laws can be
determined by forces internal to the legislative decision," this
is not the assumption that economists make in other areas of
the law.69 By taking as exogenous the setting of the appropriate sanction of the law, the courts are in essence limiting the
debate to whether a single interpretation of Title VII is efficacious and ignoring the several interpretations of Title VII that
do not represent any reasonable sense of the appropriate use of
judicial power.70 The fixity assumption prohibits the beneficiaries of Title VII from arguing for different and perhaps more
effective and efficient interpretations of Title VII by removing
the issue of judicial discretion from the debate. There are several possible interpretations of Title VII within the judicial
discretion of federal judges. Discretion has to be at the heart of
any model that will accurately describe the enforcement of
Title VII.
B. Watson and the Failureto Raise the Race Question
In a series of opinions, the Court's discretion with respect to
Title VII was made clear; thus, the importance of examining
the Court's assumptions about the possible efficacy of Title VII
are also evinced. In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,1 the
Court concluded that disparate impact analysis ought to apply

68. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983
Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1, 17-18 (1984) (stating that much legislation results from political deals
made between groups).
69. See, for example, in the area of torts, POSNER, supra note 67, at
147-53; Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523,
1523-24 (1984). See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 14-24 (1987).
70. I suggest infra that there have been multiple interpretations of
Title VII during the twenty years of the law's implementation. See infra

notes 79-97 and accompanying text. For elaboration, see also Jerome M.
Culp, A New Employment Police for the 1980's: Learning from the Victories and Defeats of Twenty Years of Title VII, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 895,
899-908 (1985). Interpretation of Title VII is an "instance[] of interstitial
lawmaking that inevitably bec[a]me part of the judicial process." Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 531 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

71. 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (plurality opinion).
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to subjective and discretionary decisions of employers.72 Two
of the three opinions also stake out a position on how much
incentive ought to be given to employers to hire historically
underrepresented groups. It is these views of the size of the
incentive that will determine the law's future effectiveness.
The Watson opinion contains two central errors."
First, Justice O'Connor alters the established requirement
that employers carry the burden of proof and, accordingly,
must demonstrate-or lose the suit-the business necessity of
the allegedly discriminatory employment practices.7" Justice
72. Id. at 989-91. Both concurrences joined this portion of Justice
O'Connor's opinion. See id. at 1000 (Blackmun J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); id. at 1011 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment).
73. Professor Edmund Kitch contends that the Court looks at United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), from a black focus:
The legislative history marshalled in support of the Court's "legislative spirit" is black in its focus, and no similar legislative
history exists for any other groups. Congress' primary concern in
enacting the prohibition against racial discrimination in Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was with "the plight of the Negro
in our economy," said the Court.
Edmund W. Kitch, The Return of Color-Consciousness to the Constitution:
Weber, Dayton, and Columbus, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 5 (Philip B.
Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1979) (emphasis added and footnote
omitted). Kitch discounts whether the Court can really adopt this black
focus without also looking at how these questions would affect other
groups such as ethnic minorities and women. Id. at 5-6. The problem
with the contributions of Kitch and others is that they cannot conceive of
a court really taking a black perspective without being manifestly unfair
to white citizens. Indeed, Kitch is unaware that he is adopting a white
perspective on these issues. "The dilemma for the Court in Brown was
not that Plessy had outlived its time, but that reliance on the Plessy
doctrine had generated a host of social expectations in the South that
were not easily frustrated." Id. at 15. Of course, this is the problem from
the white majority's perspective, and the view has credibility only if one
assumes that the large disparities in educational opportunity offered to
black children met the expectations of equality in the Plessy notion of
"separate but equal." The long history of oppression suggests that, in
fact, there was something more at stake in Brown than the frustrations
of Southerners longing for "separate but equal." What the Court in
Brown found was what this history had produced, a history of oppression
in the very fiber of the Southern way of life. It is this oppression that
was frustrated by the Brown decision.
74. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 997 ("Alth6ugh we have said that an
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O'Connor made it clear that this burden is onerous and that
courts should examine carefully the proof that is made by
plaintiffs. In addition, Justice O'Connor stated that the defendant will not need to introduce formal "validation studies" to
prove the necessity of the employment practice where the need
for that practice is obvious." Justice O'Connor's shift in the
burden of proof reduces the effectiveness of Title VIi.76 It
gives employers greater leeway in determining their employment decisions and makes the sanction against discriminatory
employer activity less clear.
Second, none of the Watson plurality opinions effectively
deals with the limitation imposed by section 703(j) of Title VII,
which simply states:
[Niothing in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require
any employer.., to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of... race... on account of
employer has 'the burden of showing that any given requirement must
manifest a relationship to the employment in question,' such a formulation should not be interpreted as implying that the ultimate burden of
proof can be shifted to the defendant." (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)). In prior disparate impact cases, the court
followed this typical pattern: (1) plaintiff must establish a prima facie
case of discrimination; (2) the defendant-employer must then prove that
the employment practices are job-related. If the defendant is successful in
proving job-relatedness, the plaintiff can rebut by showing that there
were less discriminatory means. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
75. Watson, 487 U.S. at 998-99. Justice O'Connor cited several cases
which determined that the objective test was obviously necessary. See,
e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979)
(stating that employer's "goals of safety and efficiency require[d] the
exclusion of all users of illegal narcotics," including methadone users);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 249-52 (1976) (holding that employer
met job-relatedness requirement by demonstrating that verbal skills test
results were related to success in the police academy).
76. Justice Blackmun correctly asserts that the Court's opinion extends the analysis of disparate treatment cases, as found in Texas Dep't
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), to disparate impact cases. Watson, 487 U.S. at 1000-02 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment). See also Connecticut v. Teal, 457
U.S. 440, 456-59, 463-64 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority for confusing disparate impact and disparate treatment
reasonings).
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an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race.., in comparison
with the total number or percentage of persons of such
race ... in any community, State, section, or other area, or in
the available work force ....

The Justices have been unable to see the limits of this section. It limits the reach of Title VII, that is, it is a shield for
some managerial prerogatives. But just as important, it is a
narrow shield. Title VII was meant to increase the number of
black employees. The Court's failure to understand that there
is a difference between the prohibition in section 703(j) and a
prohibition against the courts looking at numbers at all is a
mistake that the Court has made before. This confusion runs
the risk that Title VII will be even further eviscerated as an
effective tool in eliminating the vestiges of racial oppression.
When the Court holds that numbers do not matter, it is in
essence contending that the race question does not need to be
asked about the policy effectiveness of Title VII.
How do judges change incentives for employers to hire black
or other workers protected by Title VII?' The answer is that

77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1981).
78. Three problems with the courts and sanctions need to be addressed. What if the federal judges do not understand the part of Title
VII that establishes sanctions as an enforcement tool? If federal judges
are applying Title VII law without understanding that element, the sanction may be reduced in effectiveness. In addition, some judges are likely
to interpret Title VII as ruling out this kind of argument. This, in essence, is what is discussed in connection with Watson in the text accompanying notes 79-90. Both of these problems have similar solutions. The
law has built-in sanction aspects; and even if judges do not consciously
seek to set a particular sanction point, they will indirectly create such a
point whenever they make policy about Title VII. This is the legal equivalent of a shadow price in economic models. Such prices are the economic
product of constraints imposed on individuals and institutions by limitations on resources and time. Economists have long argued that implicit
prices are put on scarce attributes even when those attributes are not
actively traded in a market setting. Courts, whether they like to do so or
not, implicitly set a sanction point when they change Title VII policy.
The economic issues addressed in this paper exist even if the participants
in the legal process do not understand the constraints under which the
issues are produced. Participants in the American legal system either
must be constrained by such implicit sanctions or discover a method of
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any decision about the procedural or substantive construction
of Title VII has consequences in terms of the number of black
people and women hired by firms. The Court cannot ignore
that fact by determining that some aspect of this issue is out of
bounds. It is impossible for the courts to be neutral about the
impact of the Act on participants in the legal process.
The legal issue at the heart of Watson was simple. Can a
Title VII plaintiff apply disparate impact analysis to "discretionary" or "subjective" criteria?79 The Court adopted the dis0
parate impact analysis in Griggs v. Duke Power Company."
In Griggs, the issue was whether the use of intelligence tests
and high school diplomas as. pre-employment requirements
that had a disparate impact on blacks discriminated against
black applicants for employment."' The Court held that the
use of these standards, considering the history of discrimination, violated Title VII. The Court looked beyond the narrow
construct of the statute to the reality of what Griggs sought to
accomplish: "[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent
does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups
and are unrelated to measuring job capability.8 2
Prior to Watson, the lower courts split on whether this disparate impact analysis should apply to subjective procedures
as well as objective ones. Because the definition of subjective

transforming the job market fundamentally in ways that permit individuals to ignore these sanctions. Finally, some may contend that the implicit
sanction point set by judges has been placed, and must be placed, at a
point where the relative impact on black employment is small or nonexistent. This would be true if there were some changes in employer behavior that made the enforcement of Title VII sanctions impossible to enforce and produce contradictory forces. See Posner, supra note 2, at 517.
The problem with this approach is that it does not even attempt to ask

the relevant question: Is this negligible effect on black employment the
necessary result of the present structure of society or a product of a
particular set of choices by federal judges? I should add that I believe
that in some time periods Title VII has had more than a negligible impact on the relative economic position of blacks.
79. Watson, 487 U.S. at 984-85.
80. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
81. Id. at 425-26, 431.

82. Id. at 432.
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procedure is somewhat arbitrary, several lower courts refused
to "extend" Griggs to these situations. Speaking for a*unanimous eight-member Court on this issue, Justice O'Connor held
that Griggs does apply to "subjective" or "discretionary" employment procedures as well as objective employment criteria:
We are persuaded that our decisions in Griggs and succeeding cases could largely be nullified if disparate impact analysis were applied only to standardized selection practices ....
So long as an employer refrained from making standardized
criteria absolutely determinative, it would remain free to give
such [objective criteria] almost as much weight as it chose
without risking a disparate impact challenge. If we announced a rule that allowed employers so easily to insulate
themselves from liability under Griggs, disparate impact
analysis might effectively be abolished.'
Justice O'Connor offers a definition of the proper use of
discretionary employer power in the second part of this decision, which Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and Brennan contest
in their dissent. Justice O'Connor states the concern:
Respondent and the United States are thus correct when they
argue that extending disparate impact analysis to subjective
employment practices has the potential to create a Hobson's
choice for employers and thus to lead in practice to perverse
results. If quotas and preferential treatment become the only
cost-effective means of avoiding expensive litigationand potentially catastrophic liability, such measures will be widely
adopted. The prudent employer will be careful to ensure that
its programs are discussed in euphemistic terms, but will be
equally careful to ensure that the quotas are met. Allowing
the evolution of disparate impact analysis to lead to this
result would be contrary to Congress' clearly expressed intent, and it should not be the effect of our decision today.
... [Pilaintiff is... responsible for isolating and identifying the specific employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical disparities ....
Once the employment practice at issue has been identified, .. . plaintiff must offer statistical evidence of a kind and
degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has

83. Watson, 487 U.S. at 989-90.
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caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of their membership in a protected group ....
...
[Tihe high standards of proof in disparate impact
cases are sufficient in our view to avoid giving employers
incentives to modify any normal and legitimate practices by
introducing quotas or preferential treatment."

Thus, Justice O'Connor defines the standards affecting the
economic position of black Americans through Title VII. The
Court balances the concerns of employers not to be overburdened by Title VII requirements to hire black employees with
their rights to define the rules of the work place. O'Connor is
concerned with the impact of the legal rule on the prudent
employer. This viewpoint of how law ought to affect those
touched by its imprimatur seems to appreciate the possibility
of creating effective change in the labor market.' O'Connor,
quoting Justice Rehnquist in Furnco, concludes: "In evaluating
claims that discretionary employment practices are insufficiently related to legitimate business purposes, it must be
borne in mind that '[c]ourts are generally less competent than
employers to restructure business practices, and unless mandated to do so by Congress they should not attempt it.'"86
Justice O'Connor interprets Title VII law to include a provision
that employers are required to pay equal pay for equal work
and also that there be some right to a job for which one is
qualified by experience. But the Court undercuts that requirement by taking the teeth out of Title VII enforcement by increasing the difficulty of proving discrimination and decreasing

84. Id. at 993-94, 999 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
85. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 184-85, 189 (1977) (discussing the policymaking effect of legal theory); Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Judex Economicus, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,

Autumn 1987, at 109-11.
86. Watson, 487 U.S. at 999 (quoting Furnco Construction Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.)). This view of the
Court's role is similar to the rule adopted by Judge Posner in his academic writing. See POSNER, supra note 67, at 241. However, I have criticized this view elsewhere. See Culp, supra note 85 at 101-105, 121-129.
Others have proposed alternative ways for judges to view their roles. See,
e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1630, 163-66 (1982).
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the problem for defendants of eliminating the possibility of liability. Certainly, Justice Blackmun correctly noted:
[I]t... make[s] no sense to establish a general rule whereby
an employer could more easily establish business necessity
for an employment practice, which left the assessment of a
list of general character qualities to the hirer's discretion,
than for a practice consisting of the evaluation of various
objective criteria cafefully tailored to measure relevant job
qualifications. Such a rule would encourage employers to
abandon attempts to construct selection mechanisms subject
to neutral application for the shelter of vague generalities."
In reply, Justice O'Connor questions what the appropriate

"constraints that operate to keep [disparate impact] ...

analy-

sis within its proper bounds" are.88 In her view, these constraints are the congressionally-mandated limits on preferential treatment or numerical quotas. 9 Therefore, Justice
O'Connor believes, since Congress said that there can be no
illegal preference, then of course the courts, in using their
equitable powers to interpret and effectuate Title VII, cannot
closely scrutinize the results of employers' decisions. But Justice O'Connor misreads the purpose and the structure of Title
VII; she assumes that in prohibiting preferential treatment,
Congress meant that any provision that imposed a duty on
employers to take seriously the requirement that blacks be
hired and promoted, as well as paid equal wages, violates that
restriction. It does not. The plurality opinion, like much of the
discussion of Title VII by economists, misreads the statute and
its purpose. 9

87. Watson, 487 U.S. at 1009-10 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
88. Id. at 994.
89. Id. at 994 n.2. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1981) (providing
in relevant part that: "[niothing contained in this subchapter shall be
interpreted to require any employer . . . to grant preferential treatment
to any individual or to any group because of the race . . . of such indi-

vidual or group").
90. The meaning of § 703(j) has been much debated in both legal
literature and court cases. Unfortunately, the heat of this debate has
produced little agreement. Some have contended that § 703(j) is simply a
required limit on the government's ability to take race into account. See,
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e.g., Kitch, supra note 73, at 3-4 (asserting that § 703(j) was a part of a
political compromise that the Court has upset by interpreting Title VII in
an illegitimate manner); Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the
Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP.
CT. REV. 1, 23 (discussing the constitutionality of race-based admissions
policies and arguing that any use of race is impermissible because it
leads to subjective evaluation by judges of such policies).
Several interpreters have come to the opposite conclusion. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Affirmative Action in Employment after Weber, 34
RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 45, 48 (1981) (arguing that Weber properly interprets
the Court's conclusions that considerations of race are sometimes appropriate); Harry T. Edwards, Race Discrimination in Employment: What
Price Equality?, 1976 U. ILL. L. F. 572, 596-97 (asserting that § 703(j) is
consistent with reasonable affirmative action policies). To say the least,
the Court has had a difficult time with the concept of race-based remedies and concerns. It has never come to grips with the inherent conflict
between its holding in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971),
and its dicta in several other cases stating that account may be taken of
race only in situations where there are identifiable victims of specific
discrimination. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
267 (1986) (Powell, J., plurality opinion) ("[Als a basis for imposing discriminatory legal remedies that work against innocent people, societal
discrimination is insufficient and over-expansive. In the absence of particularized findings, a court could uphold remedies that are ageless in
their reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the future."). See also Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S.
561 (1984) (holding that black workers may not be granted fictional seniority in order to prevent a disproportionate number of black workers
from being laid off). But see Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v.
EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 476 (1986) (holding that federal judges have remedial power to tailor relief to eliminate the effects of persistent and egregious discrimination); Local 93, Intl Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 514 (1986) (holding that federal courts have the
power to approve a consent decree that provides relief to parties who
were not the victims of identifiable discrimination); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171-72 (1987) (plurality opinion) (holding that a
federal court may order remedial relief for parties not identified as victims of discrimination when the defendant has persistently prevented the
elimination of discrimination).
Judge Edwards has argued cogently that the Supreme Court's efforts in this area can be coherently melded into a consistent theme. He
contends that the Court has said, with some appropriate caveats, that
race-conscious remedies are permissible in several settings to help blacks
who are not necessarily victims of particularized discrimination in order
to help us reach a more just society. See generally Harry T. Edwards,
The Future of Affirmative Action in Employment, 44 WASH. & LEE L.
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Title VII was viewed by contemporaries as radical legislation
that would intrude on the power of employers in the job market almost as much as labor legislation did thirty years before.
The law had two central purposes: first, to eradicate the remnants of legal apartheid in the American job market; and second, to help the economic status of black Americans." No fair
reading of the movement that led up to the passage of Title VII
or the literal words of the statute can read out that second
purpose of the statute.92 The law places extensive positive
prohibitions on private employers. Its limitation against preferential treatment is not a prohibition against using race to
check whether blacks are not being hired or promoted because
of their race.
Long ago, the Court recognized that the use of statistics to
test compliance placed certain minority-hiring performance
standards before employers. For example, in Hazelwood School
District v. United States, 3 the Court indicated that an employer who failed to hire a statistically reasonable number of
blacks from the relevant labor pool could be in violation of

REV. 763 (1987). See also Gewirtz, supra note 41 (describing an excellent
model of the various paradigms the Supreme Court has adopted in evaluating affirmative action); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination:
Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78 (1986).
91. Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social
Engineers, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1312, 1314-16 (1986) (arguing that the fair
shake principle drove the passage and development of Title VII, and that
any other approach runs the risk of doing great harm to society's standards and those who are to be assisted by social engineering).
92. Title VII was the culmination of a long fight by black citizens
for racial equality in the job market. Efforts to get federal assistance to
protect individual job rights go back at least to World War II and the
Fair Employment Practice Committee (FEPC). See HERBERT HILL, BLACK
LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 173-84, 189-381 (1977). But see
HANES WALTON, WHEN THE MARCHING STOPPED: THE POLITICS OF CIVIL
RIGHTS REGULATORY AGENCIES 18-21 (1988) (arguing that black leaders
did not participate in the drafting of the legislation that became Title
VII and stating that Title VII was largely drafted in the Justice Department without much direct input from black leaders). Walton's view underestimates the impact that the most recent twenty years of struggle
had on structuring the issues for debate.
93. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
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Title VII. But in her opinion in Watson, Justice O'Connor
confused the statute's clear statement that there need be no
quotas by concluding that the statute did not intend that an
employer should be concerned with the number of black employees hired." Nothing in Title VII permits such an interpretation. The reason for the confusion is clear. It results from the
Court's failure to appropriately ask the race question, i.e., how
will racial bias impact how issues of interpretation will play
out in the labor market?
Curiously, the Court's discussion of Title VII in Watson
states that the Court should not interfere with the legitimate
business decisions of employers, but then contends that a
change of procedures by employers so that they worry about
the number of blacks hired would violate the law." By this
interpretation, the Court, unknowingly and thus without acknowledging it, turns Title VII on its head to protect white
employers' ability to perpetuate procedures that freeze black
workers out of the job market, while forestalling any success
by the processes created by Title VII to encourage employers to
take account of the number of black workers hired.97 Congress
could not have intended to adopt the Court's perspective even
if it'reflected the view of certain people in Congress. In addition, Congress re-enacted and revised the legislation with a
clear congressional intent to give broad protection to black
workers. The comment of one writer that what was meant in

94. Id. at 308.
95. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988)

(plurality opinion).
96. Id. at 993-94.
97. Some additional support for this perspective can be found in the
Court's opinion in Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 450 (1982) (action
brought by black employees claiming that a written promotion exam discriminated against them on the basis of race). The Court rejected the use

of the "bottom line," i.e., that the final number of workers included a
larger than expected number of black workers, as a defense to a charge

that the use of a test that improperly excluded some incumbent black
workers violated the protection of Title VII.. Id. at 451. Justice Brennan
tells us that Title Vi's "principal focus .. . is the protection of the individual employee." Id. at 453. Unfortunately, Justice Brennan does not
satisfactorily deal with how the individualistic concern melds with the
issue of group discrimination.
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all of the first and second Reconstruction legislation was simply a "fair shake"98 seems not only hard to reconcile with the
available evidence, but inconsistent with the fervor that existed among black people when this legislation was passed."
The position taken by Justice O'Connor is bad social policy and
bad law.
However, it was exactly this bad social and legal policy that
a majority adopted in Wards Cove to alter the landscape of
Title VII litigation. It is this policy that the Civil Rights Act of
1991 most desperately tried to change, but since the drafters of
this statute did not clearly and unequivocally reject the confusion in Justice O'Connor's opinion and the history of failing to
effectively address race, the statute has not eliminated the
important concerns that instigated the need for reform.
IV.

MAKING THE REFORMS PERMANENT: JUDICIAL DISCRETION,

JURIES AND THE 1991 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

The structure of the reforms of the 1991 Civil Rights Act is
three-fold. The Act permits jury trials for certain forms of discrimination and allows for some punitive and compensatory
damages beyond the traditional remedies available under Title
VII. 1' The Act bifurcates the possible remedies available under Title VII. It permits those who can prove intentional discrimination to seek punitive and compensatory damages. '
However, it restricts damages for disparate treatment cases to
the traditional remedies of injunctive relief, reinstatement and
back pay (limited to two years). ' These remedies have some
positive potential for the number of blacks and women who

98. See Abram, supra note 91, at 1314-16.
99. One alternative to arguing for a different reading of Title VII
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by federal judges is to look to other legal remedies
available outside the federal courts. For example, Professor Austin has
argued for extending tort notions to some employment contexts. See Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1988). Title VII
remains the chief means of creating a national standard of treatment for
black Americans, and unless the state courts change, it will remain so.
100. § 102(b)-(c), 105 Stat. at 1073.
101. § 102(b), 105 Stat. at 1073.
102. See §§ 102(a), 102(bX2), 107(b), 105 Stat. at 1072-73, 1075-76.
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will be hired by firms covered by these provisions. The possibility that punitive and compensatory damages will be imposed
against firms when individuals can prove intentional discrimination will force firms to change some of their hiring procedures and may encourage firms to hire more blacks and*women. The effectiveness ofthese sanctions on employers is going
to depend directly on the ability and willingness of juries and
judges to make the sanctions implicit in the 1991 Civil Rights
Act real. If the Act is interpreted by these fact finders as having limited impact and if the penalties imposed on employers
are small, then little will be accomplished by the 1991 Civil
Rights Act. By limiting the remedies available to plaintiffs in
cases involving disparate impact analysis, the drafters have
undermined significantly the incentives of employers to focus
on the number of blacks and women hired.
V. Two UNSOLVED PROBLEMS OF TITLE VII
To demonstrate the weaknesses of the 1991 Civil Rights Act,
I want to mention two issues that I think will predominate for
the next ten years of employment discrimination law. First is
the application of Title VII to small employers and temporary
workers. One of the largest and growing areas of the labor
market is the temporary sector. This sector is comprised of
employees who are hired for a temporary purpose and limited
time, with few benefits. These workers often are not covered by
union contract even if primary workers are. Therefore, this is a
situation where government protection is strongly needed.
Will the 1991 Civil Rights Act provide that kind of coverage
for these workers? Does the 1991 Civil Rights Act require employers to ask the race question with respect to these concerns?
The answer depends primarily on how the courts and juries
interpret this statute. If judges are willing to examine
employers' initial decisions not to hire racial minorities and
are willing to interpret the actions of employers as amounting
to intentional discrimination, then employers will not think
that an additional benefit of hiring temporary workers and/or
hiring in small units is the ability to hire only white workers.
It is important to note that the answer to this question depends on how much public policymakers and lawyers argue the
continuing importance of racial difference in the labor market.
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If a majority of federal judges conclude that Donald Trump's
claim that he wanted to come back as a black man because
they had all of the advantages is believable,"° then the 1991
Civil Rights Act will have little impact on the segment of the
market that directly affects the least educated and advanced
sector of the black labor force.
Similarly, the impact of the 1991 Act on hiring in professional settings is also important to a different segment of the labor
market. White faculty often complain about the small amount
of affirmative action that takes place in their arenas. They
contend that affirmative action programs that, for example,
require them to look for appropriate black or other racial minorities limit the opportunities of white applicants. Alternatively, black faculty contend that white faculties often find an
appropriate white candidate and then do a search to verify the
conclusion that they have already reached. Will the 1991 Act
address either of these stories about affirmative action on
campus? The answer again depends upon the stories we tell to
judges and juries and what they believe about the factual circumstances underlying the 1991 Act. If the judges and juries
believe the first scenario, they will permit white plaintiffs to
successfully challenge the limited amount of affirmative action
available under Title VII. If these same judges and juries see
the reality of racial circumstances, they will be willing to play
a role in interpreting Title VII to prevent the widespread and
unchecked abuse of faculty prerogatives to avoid consideration
of women and minority candidates. If it is understood that the
fixity assumption does not hold and that judges and juries can
ask the race question, they will interpret Title VII in ways
which permit real and important progress. Many believe that
this issue of discretion is simply a question of the conservative
(in racial terms) judges appointed during the Reagan and Bush
presidencies, but this view ignores the power of the stories told
to judges over time. In addition, the 1991 Civil Rights Act
provides for juries for these cases. This means that it is not
just the views of judges that matter, but also the views of the
jurors. This means that if the 1991 Civil Rights Act is to do its

103. Clarence Page, Donald Trump's Harmful Ignorance, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 10, 1989, at C3.
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job in terms of helping improve the economic status of black
people, we have to persuade the public at large of its importance.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, even as amended by
the 1991 Civil Rights Act, will not eliminate all of the ills that
exist in our society in terms of race. By asking judges and
juries to deal with the race question, I am not asking them to
do the impossible, but I am assuming in a way counter to the
views of many (perhaps all) on the current Supreme Court,
that Derrick Bell is right and that racial difference is a permanent and irreversible fact of this nation's legal and economic
landscape. This is expressed differently by the Supreme Court
justices. When they speak of the impossibility of courts and
law dealing with societal discrimination and the importance of
not having the wrong rule buried in employer decisions, they
are implicitly assuming a reality about race that will leave
black people the permanent economic and legal stepchildren of
this country. This view is unnecessary and pernicious, but it
will only be countered if we do as the political right did and
start telling a different set of stories about the labor market to
judges and juries. The permanent impact of Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended by the 1991 Act, will ultimately be decided by those stories and who tells them.
A. Postscript:Hicks and PermanentReform-The Personal
The Supreme Court does not always follow my predictions as
expeditiously as I would expect. However, with respect to my
claim that the 1991 Civil Rights Act would not be the last
word on employment discrimination law, the Court has spoken
already. On June 25, 1993, the Court rewrote Title VII law
with respect to proof of disparate treatment cases in St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks." Hicks is stark proof that, indeed,
there cannot be permanent reform of Title VII law.
In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, a five-person majority concluded that the Court had always intended that the

104. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
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burden of persuasion remain with the plaintiff in a disparate
treatment case-even if the defendant's rationale is proven
false. The Court's decision indicates that when a defendant has
not remained absolutely mute, the trier of fact may conclude
that the rationale for the employment discrimination may
simply be "personal animosity."0l 5 The Court reached this
interesting result by claiming that this is -what the Court
meant in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine.
This view of Burdine and the burden of plaintiffs has been
advocated by what used to be the radical fringe of the legal
establishment. A few judges have agreed with this position
over the years.0" It is consistent with the Court's efforts to
formulate a uniform policy about burdens of proof that make it
more difficult for plaintiffs in general, but it is clearly a change
from what most of us who teach employment discrimination
would have thought was settled policy. Justice Scalia says that
this policy simply means that:
nothing in law would permit us to substitute for the required
finding that the employer's action was the product of unlawful discrimination, the much different (and much lesser) finding that the employer's explanation of its action was not
believable. The dissent's position amounts to precisely this,
unless what is required to establish the... [disparate treatment] prima facie case is a degree of proof so high that it
would, in absence of rebuttal, require a directed verdict for
the plaintiff (for in that case proving employer's rebuttal
noncredible would leave the plaintiffs directed-verdict case in
place, and compel a judgment in his favor). Quite obviously,

105. Id. at 2766 (Souter, J., dissenting).
106. 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981).
107. That is the only way that I can interpret the majority's interesting passage:
Only one unfamiliar with our case law will be upset by the
dissent's alarum that we are today setting aside "settled precedent" . . . . Panic will certainly not break out among the courts

of appeals, whose divergent views concerning the nature of the
supposedly "stable law in this Court" are precisely what
prompted us to take this case-a divergence in which the
dissent's version of "settled precedent" cannot remotely be considered the "prevailing view."
Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2750 (citations omitted).
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however, what is required to establish the... [disparate
treatment] prima facie case is infinitely less than what a
directed verdict demands."°
Despite Justice Scalia's assertion, this is just what the prima facie case would entail in the absence of some proof to
refute it. When a defendant has suggested fraudulent reasons
for the discharge of an employee, there is strong reason to
believe that the reasons put forward were pretextual. The
Court's affirmance of this approach is particularly problematic
because there is no positive evidence produced by the defendant that the decision was personal. Indeed, in Hicks, the
supervisor testified that he had no personal bias against the
employee."° As the dissent points out, the district court could
not fird as a matter of fact that it was personal because no
evidence had been produced. 110
As I understand Justice Scalia's opinion, any defendant in a
disparate treatment case who has presented any evidence in a
jury trial may request an instruction that if the jury believes
that the action of the particular employee was motivated by
personal animus, the jury must return a verdict for the defendant. It is hard to square such a result with the Court's prior
jurisprudence, and this interpretation of Title VII will make it
more difficult for a Title VII plaintiff to challenge the adverse
findings of the trier of fact. It is hard to square the finding of
the district court that this action might be personal with any
real use of the race question. If Justice Scalia had asked the
race question about the district court's finding, he would have
had to note that it is possible for personal bias and racial bias
to overlap and that the district court, at a minimum, must
determine whether the personal and the racial overlap. Justice
Scalia does not do this because, for him and others on the current Supreme Court, racism is a thing done by that small
group of people who hold black people always and everywhere
in low esteem and disfavor. Such a view ,of the racial situation
in America does a real disservice to the lives of black people. It
is certainly not how the Court would treat a gender discrimi-

108. IdL at 2751.
109. Id at 2766 (Souter, J., dissenting).
110. ICL
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nation case-at least against white women.'
Unless Congress rewrites the law, I would expect that more
Title VII plaintiffs will decide not to sue, will settle for less,
and will lose more cases. One might have thought that the
conservative majority on this Court might have been chastened
by Congress' actions in specifically rejecting several Supreme
Court opinions in the 1991 Civil Rights Act, but it is clear, as I
suggested above, that this Court will continue to force Congress to rewrite the Court's interpretation of Title VII law. A
number of bills have already been introduced to try to do just
that with respect to Hicks."' They will not be the last bills or
the last decisions by the Court in this area as long as the
Court is dominated by a conservative majority intent on rewriting employment discrimination law and committed to
avoiding the race question in that effort.

111. See, eg., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
112. See, e.g., H.R. 2787, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Employment
Discrimination Evidentiary Amendment).

